










ENDOGENOUS PRODUCT VERSUS PROCESS 




SASCHA O. BECKER 
PETER H. EGGER 
 
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1906 









An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




ENDOGENOUS PRODUCT VERSUS PROCESS 






This paper provides an empirical analysis of the effects of new product versus process 
innovations on export propensity at the firm level. Product innovation is a key factor for 
successful market entry in models of creative destruction and Schumpeterian growth. Process 
innovation helps securing a firm’s market position given the characteristics of its product 
supply. Both modes of innovation are expected to raise a firm’s propensity to export. 
According to new trade theory, we conjecture that product innovation is relatively more 
important in that regard. We investigate these hypotheses in a rich survey panel data set with 
information about new innovations of either type. With a set of indicators regarding 
innovation motives and impediments and continuous variables at the firm and industry level 
at hand, we may determine the probability of launching new innovations and their impact on 
export propensity at the firm level through a double treatment approach. 
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Research on the role of innovation on economic outcome has for long been
at the heart of three diﬀerent ﬁelds of the profession: macro-economics, in-
ternational economics, and industrial economics. Two central assumptions
can be thought of unifying these literatures, namely that innovation is en-
dogenous at the ﬁrm-level, and it is undertaken for the sake of distinguishing
products from competitors (horizontally or qualitatively) thereby securing
a ﬁrm’s market position against its rivals. We may associate innovation of
that kind with what we will refer to as product innovation. While macro and
trade economics tend to think of ﬁrm-level productivity as being determined
by nature or even drawn from a lottery, there is a well-established literature
in industrial organization that suggests that endogenous productivity gains
are possible through process innovation.
Overall, product characteristics and high productivity are now under-
stood as the corner stones for ﬁrms to sustain competition on the domestic
but even more so on global markets. Accordingly, we hypothesize that there
is a distinct role to play for product and and process innovations. Yet, their
distinct impact on domestic and foreign market penetration is hitherto the
target of only small bodies of theoretical and empirical work. To a large
extent, product and/or process characteristics and the corresponding modes
of innovation are typically viewed to be beyond a ﬁrm’s choice. The latter
is, however, largely at odds with both economic intuition and stylized facts.
This paper aims at contributing to previous empirical work on innovation
and exports by distinguishing between the eﬀects of product and process
innovation on ﬁrm-level export propensity, and, at the same time, by taking
full account of either kind of innovation’s endogeneity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
provides an overview of earlier theoretical and empirical work on innovation
to motivate determinants of innovations and derive hypotheses about their
consequences for productivity and export propensity. Section 3 elaborates on
the empirical framework for estimating the impact of two endogenous modes
of innovation on export propensity. Section 4 summarizes the main features
of our survey data. The empirical ﬁndings are presented in Section 5, they
are discussed and their sensitivity is investigated in Section 6, and the last
section concludes with a summary of the central ﬁndings.
22 Previous research and the contribution of
this paper
In the subsequent discussion of previous, innovation-related economic work,
it is useful to distinguish between theoretical and empirical research on the
issue.
2.1 Economic theory on innovation
There is a sizeable body of theoretical work that elaborates on the deter-
minants of innovation and their consequences for productivity and economic
growth and, to a lesser extent, for exports.
Macro-economists stress the importance of innovation in new products
as a prerequisite for economic growth. As indicated before, innovation is
endogenous itself and ﬁrms innovate more likely in large economies (where
ﬁxed costs can be covered more easily), if the (exogenous) productivity in
research labs is high, product markets are competitive, and if consumers value
a large variety and/or a high quality of available products (see Grossman
and Helpman, 1991, chapters 3 and 4). Implicitly, most of the related studies
conﬁne their interest to product innovation. Only recently, macro-economists
explore the potential diﬀerences between product and process innovations for
income, focusing on heterogeneous agents and technological unemployment
(Foellmi and Zweim¨ uller, 2005). One key ﬁnding in the latter branch of
work is that process innovation may lead to technological unemployment
in the short-to-medium run which may be oﬀset by product innovation in
the long-run. While both process and product innovation spur aggregate
income, product innovation is preferable by avoiding the adverse eﬀects of
technological unemployment.
International economic theory spots the role of product innovation for
trade in open economy growth models (Dollar, 1986; Jensen and Thursby,
1987; Grossman and Helpman, 1989, 1990, 1991, chapters 9-11; Segerstrom,
Anant, and Dinopoulos, 1990). As in closed-economy models of endogenous
growth, market size, the productivity of research labs, consumer preferences
favoring a larger variety and/or a higher quality of products, and product
market competition are key determinants of innovation. An economy’s open-
ness to trade additionally fosters product market competition and, hence,
creates an incentive for a ﬁrm to innovate. In turn, innovation is a prereq-
3uisite for ﬁrms to gain access to foreign consumer bases via exports. The
latter establishes the hypothesis of innovation-driven exports. In recent dy-
namic models with ﬁrms that exhibit heterogeneous productivity levels and,
hence, heterogeneous marginal production costs (Jovanovich, 1982; Hopen-
hayn, 1992; Melitz, 2003; Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl, 2006) investment
in ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets leads to a selection of ﬁrms: the least productive ones
do not participate at the market at all and the most productive ones sup-
ply consumers not only at home but also abroad (through exports), while
those with an intermediate productivity only face demand from domestic
consumers. There, investment in ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets (to be associated with
product innovation, see Spence, 1984) and a high corresponding outcome
(i.e., a high total factor productivity) are the key determinants of a ﬁrm’s
export propensity.
Research in industrial economics provided pioneering results on the role
of marginal cost-reducing innovations (i.e., expenditures for research and
development for the sake of process innovation) in international oligopoly
models more than two decades ago (Spencer and Brander, 1983). A higher
investment in such process innovations increases a ﬁrm’s domestic and foreign
output. However, this eventually leads to an excessive amount of innovations
of that kind. The equilibrium level of (process) innovation expenditures in-
creases with domestic and foreign market size, and it declines in the level
of trade costs and the degree of product market competition (i.e., the num-
ber of competitors in the market). Subsequent research established insights
in the relationship between process innovation and competitive pressure at
the local (Martin, 1993) and the global level (Baily and Gersbach, 1995).
More recently, an explicit treatment of product versus process innovations
and the role of competitive pressure has been delivered by Boone (2000). The
impact of product market competition on a ﬁrm’s product and process inno-
vations crucially depends on the ﬁrm’s eﬃciency relative to its competitors.
When assuming that the aggregate eﬃciency can be measured by the (inverse
of) average production costs, then, Boone’s (2000) analysis suggests that a
higher level of competitive pressure cannot increase product and process in-
novation at the same time. Rather, an increase in the competitive pressure
may increase the eﬃciency of each surviving ﬁrm but lead to the exit of less
productive ones, which is associated with a decline in product innovation.
Overall, a positive impact of competitive pressure on process innovation is a
possible, yet not a necessary outcome.
42.2 Empirical work on the determinants and eﬀects of
innovation
Numerous previous empirical studies point to a positive impact of innovation
on exports at the ﬁrm- or plant-level. Some of the related studies rely on
R&D expenditures as an indirect measure of innovations (Hirsch and Bijaoui,
1985; Kumar and Siddharthan, 1994; Braunerhjelm, 1996; Basile, 2001) and
a smaller number of studies employs survey data with explicit information on
the actual innovations (Wakelin, 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Roper and
Love, 2002; Cassiman and Mart´ ınez-Ros, 2004; Lachenmaier and W¨ oßmann,
2006). Overall, these studies point to a strong positive impact of innovations
on exports.1 While most of the mentioned studies were carried out in cross-
sectional data-sets, there is evidence of a positive impact of innovation on
exports (or export growth) also in panel data-sets (Hirsch and Bijaoui, 1985;
Cassiman and Mart´ ınez-Ros, 2004).
Surprisingly, in as much as the aforementioned theoretical models estab-
lish an endogenous determination of innovations, and economic theory on
innovation and exports addresses their simultaneous determination (Hughes,
1998), empirical micro-econometric work on innovation-driven exports tends
to model the selection of ﬁrms into innovations as a random (or exogenous)
process. Two exceptions in the latter regard are Cassiman and Mart´ ınez-
Ros (2004) and Lachenmaier and W¨ oßmann (2006). Both studies exploit
information from panel data. Cassiman and Mart´ ınez-Ros (2004) focus on
innovations as such and treat them as predetermined variables (hence, they
use once-lagged instead of contemporaneous innovations in the export re-
gressions). Lachenmaier and W¨ oßmann (2006) apply instrumental-variable
procedures to account for the potential endogeneity of innovations. One of
their major ﬁndings is that innovations are indeed endogenous and their ex-
ogenous treatment leads to largely downward-biased estimates of the impact
of innovations on ﬁrm-level exports.
2.3 Contribution of this paper
This paper departs from the strategy adopted in previous micro-econometric
work on the innovation-driven exports hypothesis in two important ways.
1A smaller number of studies that employed the less preferable R&D expenditures as
an indirect measure of innovations lacked to ﬁnd such a positive impact (see Cassiman
and Mart´ ınez-Ros, 2004, for a survey).
5First, it explicitly distinguishes between product and process innovations
in the analysis and, second, it accounts for their endogeneity by allowing
for an endogenous selection of ﬁrms into product and process innovations.2
In contrast to earlier work, we use matching techniques for multiple binary
treatments – in our case, new product and/or process innovations versus no
innovations at all – to account for self-selection of ﬁrms into either type of
innovation.
3 Empirical framework
In the subsequent analysis we assume that, after controlling for a set of
observable variables, treatment participation does not depend on treatment
outcome. The latter is also referred to as the assumption of conditional
mean-independence (see Wooldridge, 2002). One strategy of exploiting this
assumption for the purpose of treatment eﬀect identiﬁcation is propensity
score matching (see Angrist, 1998; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999, 2002; Heckman,
Ichimura, and Todd, 1997, 1998; Lechner, 2001; Heckman, LaLonde, and
Smith, 1999, provide a survey).
Since our data set allows us to disentangle product innovation from pro-
cess innovation – hence, there are two treatment indicators at the ﬁrm level
–, we have to depart from the strategy typically applied in models with a
simple binary treatment variable. Obviously, the choice set from a ﬁrm’s
perspective can not be captured by a single binary indicator, but rather it
spans a 2×2 matrix of mutually exclusive innovation-related treatments. Let
us use superscripts 0, d, and c to indicate the cases of no treatment, product
2Cohen and Klepper (1996) formulate and test a model of the determinants of product
as well as process innovation in a cross-sectional data-set of 587 U.S. ﬁrms. They ﬁnd
that large ﬁrms, in accordance with their model, have a greater incentive to pursue both
process and product innovations. However, these ﬁrms face a relatively larger incentive to
undertake process and more incremental innovations as compared to small ones. Mart´ ınez-
Ros (2000) provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of product and process
innovations in a Spanish ﬁrm-level data-set. Neither of these studies considers the impact
of these two modes of endogenous innovations on exports. Basile (2001) looks at the
eﬀect of product and process innovations (measured by two diﬀerent R&D expenditure
modes) on exports, but he treats innovations as exogenous. The paper by Lachenmaier
and W¨ oßmann (2006) also distinguishes between product and process innovations, but
only in one of the speciﬁcations in the sensitivity analysis. There, neither the impact of
product innovations nor that one of process innovations on exports is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero.
6innovation, and process innovation, respectively. Then, the four mutually
exclusive treatments are (0,0) (the no treatment case), (d,0) (new product
innovations only), (0,c) (new process innovations only), and (d,c) (both new
product and new process innovations).3 A matching approach with multiple
treatments has been derived by Lechner (2001).4
For convenience, let us refer to the no treatment outcome as Y (0,0) (i.e.,
the corresponding export propensity as captured by a binary ﬁrm-level ex-
port indicator). The remaining possible outcomes are Y (d,0), Y (0,c), and Y (d,c),
respectively. Let us use superscripts m and l as running indices for the four
treatments to determine three diﬀerent types of treatment eﬀects (see Lech-
ner, 2001). The expected average eﬀect of treatment m relative to treatment







The expected average eﬀect of treatment m relative to treatment l for a
ﬁrm randomly selected from the group of ﬁrms participating in either m or




l|S = m,l) = E(Y
m|S = m,l) − E(Y
l|S = m,l), (2)
where S is the assignment indicator, deﬁning whether a ﬁrm receives
treatment m or l. Finally, the expected average eﬀect of treatment m relative
to treatment l for a unit that is randomly selected from the group of ﬁrms




l|S = m) = E(Y
m|S = m) − E(Y
l|S = m). (3)
Note that both γm,l and αm,l are symmetric in the sense that γm,l = −γl,m
and αm,l = −αl,m, whereas θm,l is not, so that θm,l 6= −θl,m.
Estimates of the average treatment eﬀects can be obtained as follows.
First, the response probabilities for each treatment can be estimated either by
a bivariate probability model (it is customary to use a logit or a probit model).
Denote the estimated response probabilities that are a function of the vector
3Notice that the underlying choices are unordered, here.
4See also Lee (2005) for a recent discussion of this framework.
7of observable variables x as ˆ P m(x) for m = (0,0);(d,0);(0,c);(d,c), respec-
tively. Second, estimate the expectation E(Y m|S = m) by E{E[Y m| ˆ P m(x)S =
m]|S 6= m} and the expectation E(Y l|S = m) by E{E[Y l| ˆ P l(x), ˆ P m(x)S =
l]|S = m}. We apply radius matching (each treated ﬁrm is compared to all
ﬁrms within a certain radius around its propensity score), nearest-neighbor
matching (each treated ﬁrm is compared to a single control unit), and kernel
matching (each treated unit is compared to all untreated ﬁrms in a certain
area around the propensity score depending on the bandwidth of the kernel,
but inversely weighted with their diﬀerence in propensity score to the treated
unit). The average treatment eﬀect (i.e., the outer expectation above) is es-
timated as the average of the diﬀerence in outcomes between the treated and
the control units.
We pursue two alternative estimates of the standard error of each of the
treatment eﬀects. First, we compute analytic standard errors as in Lechner






























































l|S = l). (6)
In empirical applications, these analytical standard errors may deviate con-
siderably from their small-sample-counterparts. Therefore, we alternatively
compute sub-sampling-based standard errors following Politis, Romano, and
Wolf (1999). As shown by Abadie and Imbens (2006) these give reliable
variance estimates of treatment eﬀects even in small samples.
84 Data
Our data are based on the Ifo Innovation Survey that is conducted annually
by the Ifo Institute, covering more than 1,000 ﬁrms in Germany per year.
The survey asks about the structure of innovations at the ﬁrm level. In
particular, it collects information about process versus product innovation
activities and about export status. Furthermore, the survey explicitly covers
questions relating to exogenous innovation impulses and obstacles as well as
other ﬁrm-level characteristics. Beyond that, there is an industry indicator
that allows us to link industry characteristics to the micro-level data.
4.1 Dependent variables
Regarding the dependent variables, the database provides information on
whether a ﬁrm has exported and applied new product innovations or process
innovations over the last six months or not. The corresponding questions
that we rely on in our analysis can be translated as follows:
• We did not export (in year t). As our outcome variable, we construct a
dummy variable that takes a value of one if ﬁrms export and zero if they
do not.
• In the year t we have introduced (or started but not yet ﬁnished) new
product innovations. In the year t we have introduced (or started but
not yet ﬁnished) new process innovations. We use the answers to these
questions to construct two dummy variables, one that takes on a value if
new product innovations were undertaken in year t and zero else, and the
other is constructed in the same way but for process innovations.
Overall, there are 1,537 ﬁrms and 4,499 observations in our database.
Note that every observation covers three years of data because our outcome
is measured in t+1, the treatment in t and pre-treatment variables in t−1.
A cross-tabulation for export propensity and the two innovation indicators is
provided in Table 1. The entries can be summarized as follows. First, 80.00
percent of the ﬁrms in our sample conduct exports. The high fraction of
exporters is not surprising, since, by design, the survey covers mainly large
manufacturing ﬁrms. Second, 61.96 percent of the ﬁrms innovate (i.e., they
receive treatments (d,0), (0,c), or (d,c)). Of those, 23.57 percent conduct
9Table 1: Exports and innovations: a summary
Export
Treatment 0 1 Total
(0,0) 556 1,155 1,711
32.50 67.50 100.00
(0,c) 82 167 249
32.93 67.07 100.00
(d,0) 105 552 657
15.98 84.02 100.00
(d,c) 157 1,725 1,882
8.34 91.66 100.00
Total 900 3,599 4,499
20.00 80.00 100.00
Source: Ifo Innovation Survey, 1994-2004.
Possible treatments are as follows: (0,0) (the no treatment case), (d,0) (new product
innovations only), (0,c) (new process innovations only), and (d,c) (both new product and
new process innovations).
product innovations only (d,0), 8.93 percent conduct process innovations
only (0,c), and 67.50 percent do both (d,c).
4.2 Independent variables
Beyond the information for the dependent variables in our analysis, the sur-
vey asks about a set of incentives/impulses and obstables/impediments to
innovation. Of those, in our empirical model, only the following four imped-
iments exert a signiﬁcant impact on a ﬁrm’s probability to innovate: lacking
own capital; lacking external capital; long amortization period; imperfect
opportunities to cooperate with public or academic institutions. For these
obstacles to innovation, multiple answers are possible and they are numerical:
1 (not important at all); 2 (not very important); 3 (important); 4 (extremely
important). We generate a binary variable for each impediment and classify
103 and 4 as one and 1 and 2 as zero.
Furthermore, we include lagged logarithms of sales and employment at
the ﬁrm level as two separate regressors. In addition to these ﬁrm-level de-
terminants we use characteristics that vary across NACE 2-digit industries
published by EUROSTAT (NewCronos Database). In particular, we em-
ploy the once lagged German real value added in nominal Euros (to capture
the size of an industry), real value added per worker (to capture industry
productivity), and unit labor costs (to capture wage costs per unit of out-
put). Furthermore, we use inverse-distance weighted values of these vari-
ables for the EU14 economies (excluding Germany). There, each industry-
level explanatory variable xijt for industry i and time t is weighted across





j dj] with dj denoting an economy j’s inverse distance
to Germany.5 The industry-level variables control for both a ﬁrm’s compet-
itive pressure at the domestic and the Western European foreign markets.
For instance, the inverse-distance weighted value added can be interpreted as
a measure of the foreign potential supply. The higher the latter, the stronger
we conjecture competition to be for German producers. By way of contrast,
the higher the weighted foreign wage costs are relative to foreign output, the
lower we expect the competitive pressure for German producers to be ceteris
paribus. Table 2 summarizes mean and standard deviation of all covariates.
5 Estimation results
Table 3 presents the results of a multinomial logit model (assuming a logistic
cumulative density function, respectively) determining a representative ﬁrm’s
choice of product and/or process innovation. In Table 9 in the Appendix,
we report the corresponding ﬁndings based on a bivariate probit model (as-
suming a bivariate normal cumulative density function of the latent outcome
variable).
The estimates and test statistics reported in Tables 3 and 9 suggest the
following conclusions. First, the value of the log-likelihood under the bivari-
ate probit model is −4312.14 while that one under the multinomial logit is
5The notion that trade – and, hence, foreign competition – decreases in distance (i.e.,
increases in inverse distance) is one of the most robust stylized facts in empirical research
in international economics (see Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995).
11Table 2: Descriptive statistics
mean s.d.
Firm-level variables
ln(Turnover) in t−1 10.100 1.972
ln(Turnover per worker) in t−1 5.350 1.024
Indic.: Lacking own capital .293 .455
Indic.: Lacking external capital .221 .415
Indic.: Long amortization period .331 .471
Indic.: Imperfect cooperation poss. .150 .357
Sector-level variables
for Germany
ln(Value-added) in t−1 9.608 .957
ln(Value-added per worker) in t−1 -3.156 .204
ln(Unit labor cost) in t−1 -1.439 .245
for EU14
ln(Value-added) in t−1 7.915 .812
ln(Value-added per worker) in t−1 -3.000 .299
ln(Unit labor cost) in t−1 -1.795 .232
Source: Ifo Innovation Survey, 1994-2004.
−4241.27. Davidson and MacKinnon (2004) suggest selecting among such
non-nested, non-linear probability models according to a likelihood ratio
statistic based on twice the absolute diﬀerence in the corresponding log-
likelihoods (LL): LR = 2|LLprobit −LLlogit|. This test statistic is distributed
as χ2(13). Following this device, we ﬁnd that the statistic amounts to 141.71,
which is signiﬁcant at the one percent level. Hence, the data are more ap-
propriately described by the multinomial logit model, which we also use in
the sequel for matching.
Furthermore, the test statistics indicate that domestic industry variables
and weighted EU14 industry variables are group-wise and jointly signiﬁcant
at the one percent level in the model. Similarly, the included innovation
impediments are jointly signiﬁcant.
12To check whether propensity score matching achieves better balancing of
the variables in our model, we calculate the reduction of the median absolute
standardized bias in the observables included in the selection models between
the treated ﬁrms and all control units versus the treated and the matched
control units. While there is no ﬁrm rule of thumb, the statistics literature
suggests that the remaining bias should deﬁnitely be smaller than 20 percent
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). In our case, the median bias between the
treated and the matched control units amounts to about 8 percent, which
seems reasonable. In the case of statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects, the bias re-
duction is even larger. For instance, for the eﬀect (d,c) versus (0,0), the
median absolute standardized bias drops from 32.70 to 3.05. Overall, match-
ing reduces the bias by about two thirds. Similarly, comparing the pseudo-R2
of the propensity score estimation before and after matching, we ﬁnd a sig-
niﬁcant drop in explanatory power. For instance, for the eﬀect (d,c) versus
(0,0), the pseudo-R2 before matching is 0.354, i.e., the covariates are relevant
predictors in the overall sample. However, in the matched sample of nearest
neighbors, the pseudo-R2 of the same selection regression drops to 0.037,
i.e., in the matched sample, there is no remaining systematic diﬀerence in
observables between treated and control ﬁrms. Put diﬀerently, our matching
procedure does a good job in balancing ﬁrm and sector characteristics and
allows us to match comparable ﬁrms as required.
Based on these ﬁndings, we can turn to estimating the various treatment
eﬀects of product and process innovations on ﬁrm-level export propensity.
Here, we use a radius matching as our reference model outcome. This type
of matching requires that the matched control units exhibit a propensity
score that diﬀers by not more than the radius from the propensity score of
the treated unit they are matched onto. Hence, in contrast to other match-
ing estimates such as k-nearest neighbor matching or kernel matching, radius
matching enforces a certain matching quality depending on the size of the
radius (see Smith and Todd, 2005, for a discussion). We choose a radius of
0.05 in our benchmark model. However, we consider alternative matching es-
timators and a smaller radius in the sensitivity analysis. The most important
ﬁndings based on the chosen procedure are summarized in Table 4.




ln(Turnover) in t−1 .334 .353 .790
(.056) (.040) (.035)
ln(Turnover per worker) in t−1 -.161 -.246 -.552
(.094) (.064) (.056)
Indic.: Lacking own capital 1.313 1.044 1.062
(.239) (.184) (.167)
Indic.: Lacking external capital -.555 .018 -.333
(.270) (.201) (.186)
Indic.: Long amortization period 1.227 1.555 1.838
(.188) (.137) (.119)




ln(Value-added) in t−1 -.417 .414 .530
(.250) (.172) (.146)
ln(Value-added per worker) in t−1 -1.905 -2.044 -1.434
(.544) (.369) (.323)
ln(Unit labor cost) in t−1 .050 2.421 2.953
(.877) (.622) (.530)
for EU14
ln(Value-added) in t−1 .626 -.448 -.504
(.345) (.225) (.193)
ln(Value-added per worker) in t−1 .549 .200 .187
(.410) (.277) (.247)
ln(Unit labor cost) in t−1 .842 -2.603 -2.921
(.757) (.539) (.461)
Constant -8.514 -11.124 -11.696
(1.985) (1.400) (1.180)
Number of observations 4499
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































15In the table, we report estimates of all three treatment eﬀects, θm,l, αm,l,
and γm,l for all treatment pairs m and l and their standard errors. In the
ﬁrst table column, we indicate the treatment (labeled T). For instance, (d,c)
refers to ﬁrms that got the treatment product and process innovation. The
second column identiﬁes the treatment of the comparison group (i.e., that
for the matched control units; labeled C) in a similar way. For instance, the
ﬁrst row of results in the table indicates the eﬀect of receiving the treatment
(d,c) as compared to the control units with treatment (0,0). The other
columns report the estimates for the various treatment eﬀect concepts (ˆ θ, ˆ α,
ˆ γ), the analytical standard errors (ˆ σa
θ, ˆ σa
α, ˆ σa




γ).6 Our results indicate that the analytical standard
errors are slightly more conservative (i.e., smaller) than the bootstrapped
ones. In the subsequent discussion we will base our inference on bootstrapped
rather than analytical standard errors.
Overall, the results indicate that there is a strong, positive role to play for
product innovation for a ﬁrm’s propensity to export. For instance, ﬁrms that
conduct new product and process innovations (the treated – T in the ﬁrst
table column – receive (d,c)) exhibit a signiﬁcantly higher export propen-
sity than ones that neither do product nor process innovations (the matched
controls – C in the second table column – receive (0,0)). The estimates
suggest that ﬁrms receiving the treatment (d,c) exhibit an export propen-
sity that is about 8 percentage points higher than for those receiving the
treatment (0,0). Firms receiving the treatment (0,0) (i.e., no innovation
at all) exhibit an export propensity that is about 13 percent lower than for
ones with treatment (d,c). These two ATTs are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero at conventional levels. The average treatment eﬀect of (actually or hy-
pothetically) receiving the treatment process and product innovation (d,c),
given that a ﬁrm receives either (d,c) or (0,0), is ˆ α ≈ 0.10. Hence, product
and process innovation together enhance a ﬁrm’s export propensity by about
10 percentage points. Similar conclusions apply for the ATE: product and
process innovation together increase a ﬁrm’s propensity to export by about
ˆ γ ≈ 0.11 – i.e., 11 percentage points –, irrespective of and unconditional on
which treatment it actually received.
6We rely on the result in Abadie and Imbens (2006) that sub-sampling standard errors
provide unbiased estimates of the true ones while bootstrapped standard errors do not.
Here, we rely on a 1000 draws of sub-samples of size 3350.
16The eﬀect of product innovation is even stronger if a ﬁrm already engages
in process innovation. This can be seen from a comparison of the point
estimates in the third and fourth rows in the table where the treated T
receive (d,c) and (0,c), respectively, and the matched control units C receive
(0,c) and (d,c), respectively. These point estimates are larger in absolute
values than those in the ﬁrst and second lines, irrespective of whether ˆ θ,
ˆ α, or ˆ γ are considered. Even switching from process to product innovation
entails signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on export propensity (consider the two rows
at the bottom of Table 4). While product innovations alone raise a ﬁrm’s
propensity to export signiﬁcantly (see lines 7-8 in the table), their impact
is larger if process innovations were already realized. By way of contrast,
there is no signiﬁcant increase in export propensity to be expected if an
already product innovating ﬁrm undertakes process innovation, in addition.
Similarly, process innovations alone exert an insigniﬁcant impact on export
propensity (see lines 9-10 in the table).
Is there any gain from matching in this data set? To shed light on this
issue, we may compare the average treatment eﬀect under the assumption
of exogeneity of all regressors, (ˆ γexog.), with its endogenous counterpart as
reported in Table 4 (ˆ γ). The exogenous treatment eﬀect may be thought of
as the simple comparison of the average export propensity among the treated
and the untreated ﬁrms for each treatment. The corresponding exogenous
treatment eﬀect estimates (i.e., the simple mean comparisons) together with
their endogenous treatment eﬀect counterparts as of Table 4 are summarized
in Table 5. Since the average treatment eﬀects are symmetric throughout,
we only report every second estimate as compared to Table 4.
It seems worth noting that in one of the experiments even the sign of
the exogenous treatment eﬀect point estimate diﬀers from the endogenous
one (namely with treatment (0,c) and controls (d,0), i.e., T − C of (0,c) −
(d,0)). Moreover, for ﬁve of the six parameters the (absolute) diﬀerence in
the point estimates is higher than 50 percent of the endogenous treatment
eﬀect parameter. In many of these cases this diﬀerence is signiﬁcant. Hence,
accounting for self-selection into treatment is important in this data set,
leading to signiﬁcantly diﬀerent average treatment eﬀect estimates.
17Table 5: Exogenous versus endogenous multiple treatment ef-
fects
T—C ˆ γexog. ˆ σs
γexog. ˆ γ ˆ σs
γ
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(01) (d,c) – (0,0) .233 .018 .106 .033
(03) (d,c) – (0,c) .091 .020 .140 .065
(06) (d,c) – (d,0) .014 .017 .031 .037
(08) (d,0) – (0,0) .142 .030 .076 .037
(10) (0,c) – (0,0) -.027 .047 -.034 .066
(11) (0,c) – (d,0) .169 .045 -.110 .069
Source: Ifo Innovation Survey, 1994-2004.
T denotes the treatment, C the control group. Possible treatments are as follows: (0,0)
(the no treatment case), (d,0) (new product innovations only), (0,c) (new process innova-
tions only), and (d,c) (both new product and new process innovations). The endogenous
treatment eﬀects are repeated from Table 4.
6 Sensitivity analysis and discussion
We undertake several robustness checks to assess the sensitivity of our ﬁnd-
ings. In these experiments, we only report re-sampling-based standard errors
of the endogenous treatment eﬀect estimates for the sake of brevity. First,
we consider an alternative radius of only 0.005 instead of 0.05. Hence, we
enforce a considerably higher precision of the matching estimates there than
we did in our benchmark model in Table 4. Second, we use a nearest neigh-
bor matching estimator, where we compare each treated ﬁrm’s outcome to
a single nearest neighbor, irrespective of the diﬀerence of the best match’s
diﬀerence in propensity score to the treated unit (i.e., the diﬀerence might
be smaller or larger than than 5 or 0.05 percentage points as required with
the previous radius matching estimates). Third, we use an Epanechnikov
kernel-based matching with a bandwidth of 0.06 instead of the original ra-
dius matching. This kernel estimator is potentially more eﬃcient than the
radius matching estimator but it gives some weight to less comparable units
than radius matching with a narrow radius does. The bandwidth determines
this trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and unbiasedness. Let us refer to a control
unit’s absolute diﬀerence to a treated ﬁrm’s propensity score as ∆. Then,
18only those ﬁrms with ∆ ≤ 0.06 are given a weight of 1 − (∆/0.06)2 and
zero else. Hence, a larger bandwidth covers more observations and gives
more weight to less comparable ones. Fourth, we infer to which extent kernel
matching depends on the choice of the kernel bandwidth. For this we choose
a much narrower bandwidth of 0.02 which mimics (but is not identical to)
the choice of a smaller radius under radius matching. Fifth, we use an al-
ternative kernel, namely a Gaussian one with a bandwidth of 0.06. There,
the kernel weight is φ(∆/0.06), where φ(·) is the normal density and ∆ is
the absolute diﬀerence in propensity scores between a treated and a control
unit. Finally, we use the lagged export indicator as a determinant for inno-
vation activities at time t. For instance, the latter ensures that we estimate
the impact of innovation on export propensity from a comparison of treated
ﬁrms with untreated ones where the export status in the past was the same
between the treated and the untreated.
The results are presented in three tables. Table 6 summarizes the ATT
estimates (ˆ θm,l) for all sensitivity checks, Table 7 the estimates of ˆ αm,l, and
Table 8 those of ATE (ˆ γm,l). For convenience, the ﬁrst column in each of
these tables captures the benchmark results and is repeated from Table 4.
Let us start with the ATT estimates. Across the board, neither changing the
radius nor the matching estimator (nearest neighbor or alternative kernel
matching estimators with diﬀerent bandwidths instead of radius matching)
aﬀects our conclusions from above, neither in qualitative nor in quantitative
terms.
Even considering lagged export status as a determinant of innovation
mode does not change the ﬁndings in qualitative terms. However, the pa-
rameter point estimates of the treatment eﬀects are smaller in absolute value
(see column (7) in Table 6). There are two interpretations for the latter.
First, inference about the corresponding estimates is based on a smaller sam-
ple as before since one year is lost when using lagged exports and only those
observations can be used where the lead and lag of exports is available for
a ﬁrm. Second, in this experiment we rule out any impact of innovations
on future export propensity triggered by heterogeneous export status in the
past. Accordingly, the matched controls are diﬀerent from the ones in the
original experiments.
19Table 6: Multiple treatment effects: robustness checks for θ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(01) (d,c) – (0,0) .080 .077 .085 .079 .073 .075 .043
(.027) (.028) (.032) (.027) (.026) (.025) (.021)
(02) (0,0) – (d,c) -.128 -.131 -.127 -.128 -.129 -.129 -.048
(.035) (.037) (.051) (.038) (.039) (.037) (.033)
(03) (d,c) – (0,c) .157 .178 .148 .165 .205 .185 .078
(.062) (.067) (.098) (.066) (.083) (.071) (.040)
(04) (0,c) – (d,c) -.174 -.170 -.129 -.174 -.170 -.172 -.078
(.046) (.052) (.062) (.046) (.048) (.047) (.036)
(05) (d,0) – (d,c) -.033 -.034 -.037 -.030 -.032 -.030 -.018
(.024) (.027) (.037) (.025) (.025) (.025) (.019)
(06) (d,c) – (d,0) .013 .015 .021 .012 .012 .012 -.005
(.017) (.020) (.024) (.017) (.018) (.017) (.011)
(07) (0,0) – (d,0) -.081 -.058 -.042 -.079 -.067 -.075 -.030
(.042) (.050) (.061) (.043) (.047) (.044) (.034)
(08) (d,0) – (0,0) .083 .075 .070 .082 .080 .081 .062
(.032) (.039) (.048) (.032) (.036) (.033) (.027)
(09) (0,0) – (0,c) -.017 -.013 -.060 -.018 -.012 -.020 -.059
(.058) (.073) (.086) (.057) (.068) (.061) (.049)
(10) (0,c) – (0,0) -.045 -.045 -.076 -.044 -.038 -.041 .010
(.047) (.056) (.071) (.047) (.050) (.048) (.039)
(11) (0,c) – (d,0) -.131 -.111 -.084 -.130 -.125 -.129 -.054
(.050) (.060) (.068) (.052) (.053) (.051) (.044)
(12) (d,0) – (0,c) .121 .152 .178 .123 .134 .125 .019
(.054) (.063) (.079) (.056) (.059) (.057) (.036)
Source: Ifo Innovation Survey, 1994-2004.
T denotes the treatment, C the control group. Possible treatments are as follows: (0,0)
(the no treatment case), (d,0) (new product innovations only), (0,c) (new process inno-
vations only), and (d,c) (both new product and new process innovations).
Column (1): Radius matching with r = 0.05; Column (2): Radius matching with
r = 0.005; Column (3): Nearest neighbor matching; Column (4): Kernel matching,
Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth 0.06; Column (5): Kernel matching, Epanechnikov ker-
nel, bandwidth 0.02; Column (6): Kernel matching, Gaussian kernel; Column (7): Radius
matching, r = 0.05, with control for past export status.
20Table 7: Multiple treatment effects: robustness checks for α
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(01) (d,c) – (0,0) .103 .103 .105 .102 .100 .101 .046
(.025) (.026) (.032) (.026) (.026) (.025) (.021)
(02) (0,0) – (d,c) -.103 -.103 -.105 -.102 -.100 -.101 -.046
(.025) (.026) (.032) (.026) (.026) (.025) (.021)
(03) (d,c) – (0,c) .159 .177 .145 .166 .201 .184 .078
(.057) (.062) (.089) (.061) (.076) (.065) (.037)
(04) (0,c) – (d,c) -.159 -.177 -.145 -.166 -.201 -.184 -.078
(.057) (.062) (.089) (.061) (.076) (.065) (.037)
(05) (d,0) – (d,c) -.018 -.020 -.025 -.017 -.017 -.017 -.001
(.018) (.020) (.023) (.018) (.019) (.018) (.012)
(06) (d,c) – (d,0) .018 .020 .025 .017 .017 .017 .001
(.018) (.020) (.023) (.018) (.019) (.018) (.012)
(07) (0,0) – (d,0) -.081 -.063 -.050 -.080 -.070 -.076 -.038
(.036) (.042) (.049) (.036) (.040) (.037) (.028)
(08) (d,0) – (0,0) .081 .063 .050 .080 .070 .076 .038
(.036) (.042) (.049) (.036) (.040) (.037) (.028)
(09) (0,0) – (0,c) -.009 -.006 -.043 -.011 -.006 -.012 -.054
(.055) (.068) (.078) (.054) (.064) (.057) (.046)
(10) (0,c) – (0,0) .009 .006 .043 .011 .006 .012 .054
(.055) (.068) (.078) (.054) (.064) (.057) (.046)
(11) (0,c) – (d,0) -.124 -.141 -.152 -.125 -.131 -.126 -.028
(.050) (.058) (.066) (.051) (.053) (.051) (.035)
(12) (d,0) – (0,c) .124 .141 .152 .125 .131 .126 .028
(.050) (.058) (.066) (.051) (.053) (.051) (.035)
Source: Ifo Innovation Survey, 1994-2004.
T denotes the treatment, C the control group. Possible treatments are as follows: (0,0)
(the no treatment case), (d,0) (new product innovations only), (0,c) (new process inno-
vations only), and (d,c) (both new product and new process innovations).
Column (1): Radius matching with r = 0.05; Column (2): Radius matching with
r = 0.005; Column (3): Nearest neighbor matching; Column (4): Kernel matching,
Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth 0.06; Column (5): Kernel matching, Epanechnikov ker-
nel, bandwidth 0.02; Column (6): Kernel matching, Gaussian kernel; Column (7): Radius
matching, r = 0.05, with control for past export status.
21Table 8: Multiple treatment effects: robustness checks for γ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(01) (d,c) – (0,0) .106 .105 .102 .105 .103 .104 .053
(.024) (.025) (.030) (.025) (.025) (.025) (.020)
(02) (0,0) – (d,c) -.106 -.105 -.102 -.105 -.103 -.104 -.053
(.024) (.025) (.030) (.025) (.025) (.025) (.020)
(03) (d,c) – (0,c) .140 .156 .126 .142 .164 .151 .036
(.048) (.052) (.065) (.049) (.056) (.051) (.035)
(04) (0,c) – (d,c) -.140 -.156 -.126 -.142 -.164 -.151 -.036
(.048) (.052) (.065) (.049) (.056) (.051) (.035)
(05) (d,0) – (d,c) -.031 -.042 -.049 -.030 -.036 -.032 -.009
(.028) (.031) (.038) (.029) (.030) (.028) (.023)
(06) (d,c) – (d,0) .031 .042 .049 .030 .036 .032 .009
(.028) (.031) (.038) (.029) (.030) (.028) (.023)
(07) (0,0) – (d,0) -.076 -.063 -.054 -.075 -.067 -.072 -.044
(.028) (.032) (.035) (.028) (.030) (.028) (.021)
(08) (d,0) – (0,0) .076 .063 .054 .075 .067 .072 .044
(.028) (.032) (.035) (.028) (.030) (.028) (.021)
(09) (0,0) – (0,c) .034 .051 .023 .037 .061 .047 -.016
(.049) (.053) (.065) (.049) (.056) (.052) (.033)
(10) (0,c) – (0,0) -.034 -.051 -.023 -.037 -.061 -.047 .016
(.049) (.053) (.065) (.049) (.056) (.052) (.033)
(11) (0,c) – (d,0) -.110 -.114 -.077 -.112 -.128 -.119 -.027
(.050) (.055) (.069) (.052) (.058) (.054) (.035)
(12) (d,0) – (0,c) .110 .114 .077 .112 .128 .119 .027
(.050) (.055) (.069) (.052) (.058) (.054) (.035)
Source: Ifo Innovation Survey, 1994-2004.
T denotes the treatment, C the control group. Possible treatments are as follows: (0,0)
(the no treatment case), (d,0) (new product innovations only), (0,c) (new process inno-
vations only), and (d,c) (both new product and new process innovations).
Column (1): Radius matching with r = 0.05; Column (2): Radius matching with
r = 0.005; Column (3): Nearest neighbor matching; Column (4): Kernel matching,
Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth 0.06; Column (5): Kernel matching, Epanechnikov ker-
nel, bandwidth 0.02; Column (6): Kernel matching, Gaussian kernel; Column (7): Radius
matching, r = 0.05, with control for past export status.
22Similar conclusions apply for the estimates in Tables 7 and 8. Overall,
neither the functional form of the multiple choice model, nor the alterna-
tive values for the radius, the type of the matching estimator (radius versus
nearest-neighbor versus kernel), nor the kernel bandwidths or the functional
forms of the kernels have a qualitative impact on the signiﬁcant ﬁndings in
the original table. Again, the impact of innovations is quantitatively smaller
if we use lagged export status as a determinant of contemporaneous innova-
tion mode in the selection models. However, most of the originally signiﬁcant
estimates remain signiﬁcant even in this case and none of the 24 estimated
point estimate signs in column (7) of Tables 7 and 8 is diﬀerent from those
in the other columns of the same tables.
In general, this paper’s analysis provides robust evidence that product
innovation is more important than process innovation for a ﬁrm’s export
propensity. However, while process innovation seems of little relevance for
export propensity, it improves a ﬁrm’s probability to export if it is accom-
panied by product innovation.
7 Conclusions
Our goal in this paper was to provide novel empirical insights in the role
of product versus process innovation on export propensity at the ﬁrm level.
Either of these modes of innovation has been hypothesized to aﬀect ﬁrm-level
productivity in previous theoretical work. A smaller body of theoretical re-
search even pointed to the diﬀerential impact of these two types of innovation
on a ﬁrm’s export propensity. We aim at assessing the latter relationship em-
pirically. Economic theory suggests that ﬁrms do not undertake innovations
at random, neither product nor process innovations. Hence, empirical work
should pay attention to the likely self-selection of ﬁrms into innovations.
Viewing innovations as a ’treatment’, this lends support to an endogenous
treatment approach to innovations and export propensity. With two modes
of innovations – product and process innovations –, one is then faced with
an econometric framework with multiple endogenous treatments.
Adopting a so-called matching approach based on the propensity score
and using survey data of German ﬁrms available from the Ifo Institute, we
ﬁnd that there is signiﬁcant bias of the impact of product and process inno-
vations on export propensity when ignoring self-selection into either mode of
innovation. This bias was quite substantial in our application, having been
23particularly large for ﬁrms with only product or process innovations as com-
pared to ones that did not innovate. The largest estimated self-selection bias
in the data amounted to more than 200 percent, depending on the mode of
innovations (product and/or process innovation).
Overall, the results point to the importance of product innovation rela-
tive to process innovation. In comparison, there is no evidence that process
innovation fosters a ﬁrm’s propensity to export beyond product innovation.
This can be viewed as evidence on the importance of the extensive margin
in product space for a ﬁrm’s entry into export markets, lending support to
new trade and endogenous growth theories with their emphasis on product
innovations.
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Appendix
Table 9 summarizes the results of the bivariate probit model for the two choice
indicators, product and process innovation. In contrast to the multinomial
logit model in Table 3, it assumes a bivariate normal cumulative density
function of the latent outcome variable.
27Table 9: Product and process innovations: bivariate probit
Product innovation Process innovation
(1) (2)
Firm-level variables
ln(Turnover) in t−1 .352 .346
(.017) (.016)
ln(Turnover per worker) in t−1 -.258 -.238
(.028) (.027)
Indic.: Lacking own capital .429 .400
(.079) (.074)
Indic.: Lacking external capital -.058 -.223
(.087) (.081)
Indic.: Long amortization period .821 .628
(.057) (.052)




ln(Value-added) in t−1 .326 .114
(.074) (.071)
ln(Value-added per worker) in t−1 -.640 -.428
(.161) (.155)
ln(Unit labor cost) in t−1 1.638 .971
(.269) (.258)
for EU14
ln(Value-added) in t−1 -.325 -.047
(.098) (.093)
ln(Value-added per worker) in t−1 -.026 .046
(.122) (.120)






Number of observations 4499
Source: Ifo Innovation Survey, 1994-2004. 28CESifo Working Paper Series 
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